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JULIAN v. CHRISTOPHER: NEW STANDARDS FOR
LANDLORDS' CONSENT TO ASSIGNMENT
AND SUBLEASE
I. INTRODUCTION
Injulian v. Christopher,' the Maryland Court of Appeals held that
when a lease requires a tenant to obtain the landlord's consent to an
assignment or sublease, consent may not be unreasonably withheld
unless the lease explicitly gives the landlord the right to withhold
consent arbitrarily.2 The court opted, however, to apply its holding
prospectively only, except with regard to the parties before it.'
Julian reverses a common-law rule established in Maryland
nearly thirty years ago inJacobs v. Klawans.4 Klawans held that a "si-
lent consent" clause- would be interpreted to permit a landlord ar-
bitrarily to refuse consent.' With Julian, Maryland joins a growing
minority of jurisdictions that have rejected the rule represented by
Klawans, by reading a reasonableness requirement into "silent con-
sent" clauses.7
1. 320 Md. 1, 575 A.2d 735 (1990).
2. Id. at 11, 575 A.2d at 740.
3. Id. at 11-12, 575 A.2d at 740. The decision will apply only to leases entered into
after July 30, 1990, the date the mandate of this case was issued. See MD. R. 8-606(b)
1990 (mandate to be issued 30 days from the filing of the opinion). For a discussion of
the court's decision to apply its holding prospectively, see infra notes 38-47 and accom-
panying text.
4. 225 Md. 147, 169 A.2d 677 (1961).
5. Julian, 320 Md. at 8, 575 A.2d at 738 ("silent consent" clause requires the land-
lord's consent to assign or sublease, but does not provide a standard for the landlord's
decision) (quotations in original). The fact that the clause in question was silent on the
standard for consent leads the court in Julian to refer repeatedly to such a clause as a
"silent consent" clause. This could be misconstrued to imply that "silent" describes the
character of the consent, when it really describes only the fact that the clause provides
no standard. Describing it as an unqualified consent clause, omitting the word "silent" and
the quotation marks, might have avoided this confusion.
6. Klawans, 225 Md. at 152, 169 A.2d at 679.
7. Before Julian, courts in 15 jurisdictions had adopted the minority position. See
Homa-Goff Interiors, Inc. v. Cowden, 350 So. 2d 1035 (Ala. 1977); Hendrickson v.
Freericks, 620 P.2d 205 (Alaska 1980); Tucson Medical Center v. Zoslow, 147 Ariz. 612,
712 P.2d 459 (1985); Warmack v. Merchants Nat'l Bank of Fort Smith, 272 Ark. 166, 612
S.W.2d 733 (1981); Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 40 Cal. 3d 488, 709 P.2d 837, 220
Cal. Rptr. 818 (1985); Basnett v. Vista Village Mobile Home Park, 699 P.2d 1343 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 731 P.2d 700 (1987); Warner v. Konover, 210
Conn. 150, 553 A.2d 1138 (1989); 1010 Potomac Assocs. v. Grocery Mfrs., 485 A.2d 199
(D.C. 1984); Fernandez v. Vasquez, 397 So. 2d 1171 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Funk v.
Funk, 102 Idaho 521, 633 P.2d 586 (1981);Jack Frost Sales v. Harris Trust & Say. Bank,
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II. THE CASE
Douglas Julian and William J. Gilleland, III, leased business
premises, including an upstairs apartment, and purchased a tavern
and restaurant business on those premises, from landlord Guy D.
Christopher.' The lease provided that the premises could not be
assigned or sublet "without the prior written consent of the land-
lord." 9 After they took occupancy, the tenants asked the landlord
for permission to sublease the upstairs apartment.' ° The landlord
responded that he would grant permission only if Julian and Gille-
land agreed to pay $150 in additional monthly rent. I I The tenants
permitted the sublessee to move in, whereupon the landlord filed an
action requesting repossession of the building, charging that the
tenants violated the lease by subletting the premises without per-
mission. 2 The District Court for Baltimore City, and, on appeal,
the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, found in favor of the landlord,
relying on the Klawans rule.'3 The Court of Appeals granted certio-
rari to consider whether Klawans "should be modified in light of the
changes that have occurred since that decision.'"'4
III. THE DECISION
In deciding to overrule Klawans and adopt the "minority
rule," ' 5 the court initially noted that Klawans' foundations have been
"substantially eroded."' 6 It then offered two public policy reasons
104 11. App. 3d 933, 433 N.E.2d 941 (1982); First Fed. Say. Bank v. Key Markets, 532
N.E.2d 18 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988); Gamble v. New Orleans Housing Mart, Inc., 154 So. 2d
625 (La. Ct. App. 1963); Newman v. Hinky Dinky Omaha-Lincoln, Inc., 229 Neb. 382,
427 N.W.2d 50 (1988); Boss Barbara, Inc. v. Newbill, 97 N.M. 239, 638 P.2d 1084
(1982).
8. Julian, 320 Md. at 4, 575 A.2d at 736.
9. Id. The tenants testified that the landlord told them the clause merely prevented
them from subletting or assigning the lease to "someone who would tear the apartment
up." Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id
13. Id. The circuit judge noted that "if you don't have the words that consent will
not be unreasonably withheld, then the landlord can withhold his consent for a good
reason, a bad reason, or no reason at all ...." Id.
14. Id.
15. The "minority rule" adopted injulian imposes a reasonableness requirement on
a landlord's refusal to consent to a sublease, unless the lease explicitly permits the land-
lord to reject arbitrarily any sublessee. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. The
"majority" rule permits a landlord absolute discretion in approving subleases, unless
limited by the contract language. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 15.1 (1976).
16. Julian, 320 Md. at 5, 575 A.2d at 736.
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for changing the law: first, the policy against restraints on alienation
of property,' 7 and second, the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing applicable to all contracts.' 8
A. The Erosion of Klawans
When Klawans was decided in 1961, the weight of authority
overwhelmingly supported the majority rule. 9 Subsequently, both
case law and commentators have made a pronounced shift toward
the minority position.20 Perhaps most significant, the American Law
Institute endorsed the minority view in the second Restatement of
Property, published in 1976.21 In light of the "burgeoning minority
position," 22 the court considered whether public policy would sup-
port overruling Klawans.23
B. Restraints on Alienation Not Favored
At common law, restraints on alienation of property are disfa-
vored.24 Thus, "absent some specific restriction in the lease, a
lessee has the right to freely alienate the leasehold interest by as-
signment or sublease without obtaining the permission of the les-
17. Id at 8, 575 A.2d at 738.
18. Id.
19. See Klawans, 225 Md. 147, 151, 169 A.2d 677, 679 (1961).
20. See, e.g., R. PowEL. & P. RoHAN, PowELL. ON REAL PROPERTY 24811] (1988),
stating that
[withholding consent arbitrarily] was allowed because it was believed that the
objectives served by allowing the restraints outweighed the social evils implicit
in them, inasmuch as the restraints gave the landlord control over choosing the
person who was to be entrusted with the landlord's property and was obligated
to perform the lease covenants.
It is doubtful that this reasoning retains full validity today. Relationships
between landlord and tenant have become more impersonal and housing space
(and in many areas, commercial space as well) has become more scarce. These
changes have had an impact on courts and legislatures in varying degrees.
Modern courts almost universally adopt the view that restrictions on the ten-
ant's right to transfer are to be strictly construed.
(Footnotes omitted). See generally Johnson, Correctly Interpreting Long-Term Leases Pursuant
to Modern Contract Law: Toward a Theory of Relational Leases, 74 VA. L. REV. 751 (1988).
21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 15.2(2) (1976). The Restatement now pro-
vides that
[a] restraint on alienation without the consent of the landlord of the tenant's
interest in the leased property is valid, but the landlord's consent to an aliena-
tion by the tenant cannot be withheld unreasonably, unless a freely negotiated
provision in the lease gives the landlord an absolute right to withhold consent.
Id.
22. Johnson, supra note 20, at 755.
23. Julian, 320 Md. at 7, 575 A.2d at 738.
24. See id.
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sor."25  Further, because public policy opposes restraints on
alienation, when present, these restraints "are looked upon with dis-
favor and are strictly construed."26
If a lease's clause is open to two interpretations, public policy
favors the interpretation that least restricts alienation.27 Applying
that premise here, the court concluded that "[i]nterpreting a 'silent
consent' clause so that it only prohibits subleases or assignments
when a landlord's refusal to consent is reasonable, would be the in-
terpretation imposing the least restraint on alienation and most in
accord with public policy."28
Interestingly, Klawans also stated that restraints on alienation
are to be strictly construed.29 In Klawans, however, the court ob-
served that restraints on alienation have been justified when "the
objectives behind the imposition outweigh the social evils which
flow from the enforcement of the restraint." ' Klawans concluded
that "the right of the lessor to select a lessee of his own choosing to
occupy and use his property offsets, if it does not outweigh, any evils
flowing from the enforcement of the restriction on alienation." 3' In
reversing Klawans,Julian does not change its analysis, but reconsid-
ers the relative values of the tenant's right to sublease and the land-
lord's ownership interest. Julian implicitly found the tenant's right
to sublease outweighed the landlord's ownership interest,
32
although it did not explain why the "evil" of the restriction is
greater today than it was when Klawans was decided.
25. Id (citing R. SCHOSHINSKI, AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT § 5:6
(1980); 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.56 (A. Casner ed. 1952)).
26. Id at 9, 575 A.2d at 738-39 (citing POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 24811] (1988)).
27. Id, 575 A.2d at 739.
28. Id Other courts have used the policy against restraints on alienation to read a
reasonableness requirement into a consent clause. See, e.g., Funk v. Funk, 102 Idaho
521, 524, 633 P.2d 586, 589 (1981) (imposing upon lessors of farmland an obligation to
act reasonably in considering the lessees' request to sublease). The Funk court reasoned
that
[i]f the lessor is allowed to arbitrarily refuse consent to a sublease for what is in
effect no reason at all, such would virtually nullify the right of a lessee to sublet.
The imposition of a reasonableness standard also gives greater credence to the
doctrine that restraints on alienation of leased property are looked upon with
disfavor and are strictly construed against the lessor.
Id. (citations omitted).
29. 225 Md. 147, 151, 169 A.2d 677, 679 (1961).
30. Id.
31. Id at 152, 169 A.2d at 679.
32. See 320 Md. at 7, 575 A.2d at 738 (the court quoted from a discussion of Homa-
Goff Interiors, Inc. v. Cowden, 350 So. 2d (Ala. 1977), found in Johnson, supra note 20,
at 761-63).
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C. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
In addition to being a conveyance of property, a lease is a con-
tract in which "there exists an implied covenant that each of the par-
ties thereto will act in good faith and deal fairly with the others.""3
If a contract grants discretion to a party, it must be exercised in
accord with principles of good faith and fair dealing. In the court's
view, the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing imposes a
standard of reasonableness on withholding consent, unless the con-
sent clause permits a landlord to exercise arbitrary or subjectivediscretion.' 4
The application of contract principles to assignment and sub-
lease clauses in leases can be traced to the first decision in favor of
the minority rule, Gamble v. New Orleans Housing Mart. 5 The Gamble
court acknowledged a landlord's right to prohibit subleasing, but
determined that the mere presence of a clause requiring the lessor's
written consent implied a tenant's right to sublease. 6 It concluded
that at the time the lease was entered into, the lessee had every rea-
son to believe that he could sublet upon producing a proper subten-
ant, and therefore, "the lessor cannot unreasonably, arbitrarily, or
capriciously withhold his consent."3s7
33. Id at 9, 575 A.2d at 739 (quoting Food Fair v. Blumberg, 234 Md. 521, 534, 200
A.2d 166, 174 (1964)).
34. See id
35. 154 So. 2d 625 (La. Ct. App. 1963). In Gamble, a landlord rejected a sublessee
not because the sublessee was unacceptable to the landlord, but instead to enable the
landlord to lease other unleased space in the property to the sublessee and thereby
acquire a new tenant while retaining the plaintiff as a tenant. The lease provided only
that subleasing was prohibited without the landlord's consent. Gamble addressed the
question of "whether the... lease provision gives the lessor the arbitrary and absolute
right, without any reason and in bad faith, to refuse to give the permission required by
the provision." Id. at 626.
36. Id. at 627.
37. Id. The Gamble court traced the origin of this proposition to Louisiana's French
jurisprudential history, noting that
[u]nder French jurisprudence, the lessor who wished to reserve for himself
such an arbitrary right must have expressly so stated. When the provision, as
here, was simply a reservation for the consent of the lessor he did not have the
right arbitrarily to refuse the sublease tendered to him when such person was
solvent, honorable, and fulfilled the same conditions as the original lessee.
Id. (citing 2 M. PLANIOL, TREATISE ON THE CIVIL LAw, No. 1752, n.42 (La. Law Inst.
trans. 1959)). Though based in large part on French civil law, a number of common-law
jurisdictions have followed Gamble's reasoning. See supra note 7.
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IV. APPLICATION OF THE JULIAN RULE
A. Prospective Effect
The tenants asked the Julian court to overrule Klawans retroac-
tively, and read a reasonableness requirement into all existing leases
with "silent consent" clauses.3 8 The court refused. "In the absence
of evidence to the contrary," the court stated, "we should assume
that parties executing leases when Klawans governed the interpreta-
tion of 'silent consent' clauses were aware of Klawans and the impli-
cations drawn from the words they used. We should not, and do
not, rewrite these contracts." 9 The new rule is to be applied pro-
spectively only.4" AlthoughJulian continues a national trend by re-
versing the Klawans rule, Maryland is the first state to apply the new
rule prospectively only.4
Prospective overruling is sometimes appropriate when retroac-
tively applying the new rule would unfairly penalize those who re-
lied on the old law.42 And it is in the area of property and contract
law that reliance on precedent is often heaviest.4" By overruling
Klawans prospectively, the Julian court assumes that reliance on
Klawans was wide-spread. Even prior toJulian, however, a well-ad-
vised landlord might have been aware of the possibility that Klawans
could be overruled. Thus, the court resorted to the uncommon
remedy of prospective application without clearly demonstrating
that the situation demands it.
B. Effect on Julian Litigants
Even when a decision is to be applied prospectively only, courts
ordinarily allow the new rule to apply to the litigants as well, in or-
der to provide an incentive to challenge infirm doctrine or seek re-
38. 320 Md. at 10, 575 A.2d at 739.
39. lit
40. See id.
41. Compare cases cited supra note 7.
42. See Traynor, Quo Vadis, Prospective Overruling: A Question ofJudicial Responsibility, 28
HASTINGS L.J. 533, 542 (1977) (tracing the development of prospective overruling doc-
trine); Lewis v. State, 285 Md. 705, 713, 404 A.2d 1073, 1079 (1979) (holding that ac-
cessories to crimes could be tried before principals were sentenced or tried, but refusing
to apply the rule retroactively because to do so could "impinge upon basic fairness");
Deems v. Western Md. Ry., 247 Md. 95, 115, 231 A.2d 514, 525 (1967) (claims for loss
of consortium can only be asserted in a joint action, but the new rule applied prospec-
tively as "it would be unfair if the holding attempted to affect rights of defendants which
have ... accrued).
43. Traynor, supra note 42, at 542-43.
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versal of unsound precedent.44 Convinced that the new rule should
apply to the present litigants, but concerned about fairness to the
landlord, the court remanded the case for a new trial, at which the
landlord would have the burden of proving that it would be unfair
to bind him to the new rule.4 5 The court conceded that this proce-
dure would give Julian and Gilleland a benefit unavailable to other
similarly situated tenants,46 but in the court's view, this was an
"insignificant cost for adherence to sound principles of decision
making." 47
V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISION
Julian presents two options to a landlord who seeks to limit the
tenant's ability to sublease or assign the leased premises. The land-
lord may either negotiate the right to withhold consent arbitrarily,
or subject its consent to a standard of reasonableness.
A. Option One: Arbitrary Refusal
Julian explicitly provides that the landlord may retain the right
to act arbitrarily.48 The court even suggests appropriate language
to include in the lease: "For example, ... 'consent may be withheld
in the sole and absolute subjective discretion of the lessor.' "49
44. See Julian, 320 Md. at 12, 575 A.2d at 740. The court quoted at length from
Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Il. 2d 11, 28, 163 N.E.2d 89, 97
(1959). In Molitor, the Illinois Supreme Court noted that (1) to announce a rule and not
apply it to the controversy before the court would render it mere dictum, and (2) to
refuse to apply the rule in the instant case would "deprive appellant of any benefit from
his effort and expense in challenging the old rule .... Thus there would be no incentive
to appeal the upholding of precedent since appellant could not in any event benefit from
a reversal invalidating it." Id. See Williams v. State, 292 Md. 201, 217, 438 A.2d 1301,
1309 (1981) (prospectively changing the common law to enable counsel to waive a de-
fendant's right to be present at every stage of his criminal trial, and giving the defendant
in question the benefit of the new rule by ordering a new trial). For a criticism of the
"reward" theory of partial retroactivity, see Traynor, supra note 42, at 546.
45. Julian, 320 Md. at 12-13, 575 A.2d at 740-41. The court stated that on remand
the landlord could prove unfairness by establishing his reliance upon the Klawans inter-
pretation at the time he executed the lease. Id. at 13, 575 A.2d at 741.
46. A "similarly situated" tenant is one who signed the lease before the Julian deci-
sion. Under the prospective ruling, such tenants would not receive the benefit of the
Julian rule.
47. Id. (quoting Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301 (1967)).
48. Id. at 11, 575 A.2d at 740 ("If the parties intend to limit the right to assign or
sublease by giving the landlord the arbitrary right to refuse to consent, they may do so
by a freely negotiated provision in the lease clearly spelling out this intent.").
49. Id. at 11-12, 575 A.2d 740. This dictum makes it easy for parties who wish to
give arbitrary power to the landlord to so do without fear that the language they choose
will later be found ambiguous by the courts. Compare Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 40
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Viewed in this way, the court's ruling simply guarantees full disclo-
sure. Only when the meaning of the lease term is ambiguous is the
arbitrary exercise of the consent power objectionable. As the court
explained:
Because most people act reasonably most of the time, ten-
ants might expect that a landlord's consent to a sublease or
assignment would be governed by a standard of reasona-
bleness. Most tenants probably would not understand that
a clause stating "this lease may not be assigned or sublet
without the landlord's written consent" means the same
thing as a clause stating "the tenant shall have no right to
assign or sublease."5 °
A narrow reading of Julian could lead one to conclude that it
simply provides a clear rule of draftsmanship. But this analysis does
not go far enough. Leases are negotiated documents in which par-
ties expect to exchange concessions. SinceJulian effectively requires
leases to give full disclosure of the landlord's right to be arbitrary by
explicitly asserting this right in the document, the standard for eval-
uating the landlord's consent will be squarely on the negotiating ta-
ble. In that event, landlords may need to give away more than they
have previously in exchange for the undisputed right to act
arbitrarily.5 '
The Julian rule is thus more than a guide to better draftsman-
ship: it also imposes upon the landlord an economic cost.
B. Option Two: A Reasonableness Standard
After Julian, "silent consent" clauses will be interpreted to pro-
Cal. 3d 488, 709 P.2d 837, 220 Cal. Rptr. 818 (1985), in which the court's failure to
address the question of the validity of an explicit arbitrary consent clause led one com-
mentator to suggest that
[p]erhaps if the lessor says it often enough, loud enough, or both, the court will
allow the lessor to refuse consent to the assignment arbitrarily. The following
clause might be acceptable: "Lessor reserves the right to refuse consent to any
transfer of all or part of the premises and lessor may withhold his consent to
any transfer for any reason, or for no reason whatsoever, be it arbitrary, unrea-
sonable, or in bad faith and wholly devoid of merit, AND I MEAN IT."
Johnson, supra note 20, at 768 n.59.
50. Julian, 320 Md. at 8, 575 A.2d at 738.
51. Only the most sophisticated pre-Julian tenants, who properly understood the
Klawans rule as permitting arbitrary refusal when the lease contained a "silent consent"
clause, would have been in a comparable position. Most tenants would assume that the
landlord would act reasonably, as the court pointed out. See supra text at note 50. It is
not overly cynical to suspect that landlords would not correct this misconception during
lease negotiations.
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hibit a landlord's unreasonable refusal to consent to an assignment
or sublease.52 Although the court declined to address in any detail
what constitutes a reasonable refusal to consent, 53 its limited com-
ments are helpful. Reasonable objections could include "the
financial irresponsibility or instability of the transferee, or the un-
suitability or incompatibility of the intended use of the property by
the transferee."' Unreasonable refusal could include situations in
which "the reasons for withholding consent have nothing to do with
the intended transferee or the transferee's use of the property" or
when "the refusal to consent was solely for the purpose of securing
a rent increase . . unless the new subtenant would require
additional expenditures by, or increased economic risk to, the
landlord."5 5
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals in Maxima Corp. v. Cystic
Fibrosis Foundation56 recently considered the meaning of reasonable-
ness with regard to withholding consent to a sublease.57 In Maxima,
the lease explicitly provided that "consent shall not be unreasonably
withheld or delayed."5" The Maxima court concluded that a land-
lord may refuse a request to sublease only on objective grounds.59
"[A] landlord is normally expected to act pursuant to reasonable
commercial standards, without regard to subjective attitudes per-
sonal to the landlord."'  The Maxima court supplied specific gui-
dance as to what would constitute a reasonable basis for refusal.
Bases for good faith reasonable refusal to consent include (1) the
sublessee's inability to fulfill the terms of the lease, (2) the proposed
sublessee's financial irresponsibility or instability, (3) the suitability
of the premises for the use intended by the new tenant, or (4) an
intended unlawful or undesirable use of the premises.6' Maxima
52. See Julian, 320 Md. at 11, 575 A.2d at 740.
53. Id. at 9-10, 575 A.2d at 739.
54. Id at 10, 575 A.2d at 739.
55. Id.
56. 81 Md. App. 602, 568 A.2d 1170 (1990).
57. Maxima apparently was the first time a Maryland appellate court considered this
question. Id. at 612, 568 A.2d at 1175. In Maxima, the landlord refused to consent to
the tenant's proposed sublessee, who was subleasing another space in the building and
was described by all as an "excellent tenant." Id. at 615, 568 A.2d at 1177. The court
held that this was a subjective decision that was not commercially reasonable, and that
there were no objective problems with the proposed sublease "in and of itself." Id. at
615, 568 A.2d at 1177.
58. Id. at 612, 568 A.2d at 1175.
59. Id. at 613, 568 A.2d at 1176. The court found no objective grounds for the
landlord to refuse consent. Id at 615, 568 A.2d at 1176.
60. Id. at 613, 568 A.2d at 1176.
61. Id. (citing Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 40 Cal. 3d 488, 501, 709 P.2d 837,
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also cited with approval a District of Columbia decision which con-
cluded that the " 'landlord has no reasonable basis for withholding
consent if the landlord remains assured of all the benefits bargained
for in the prime lease.'"62
Both of Maryland's appellate courts have now provided a few
standards for evaluating whether a landlord acted reasonably in
withholding consent to a sublease or assignment. Clearly, for exam-
ple, a landlord cannot refuse to consent solely for the purpose of
extracting a rent increase unless the subtenant's presence would
mean new costs or risks for the landlord.6" Also, a landlord who
seeks to withhold consent simply to share in the increased value of
the leasehold will be considered to act unreasonably.'
It remains uncertain, though, how the court would resolve
other specific situations. A good example is the commercial lease
that contains a percentage rent clause.65 Is it reasonable for the
landlord to refuse consent when a tenant who is meeting sales pro-
jections desires to sublease to a subtenant who may not meet the
same sales figures? Can the landlord's decision be affected by the
fact that the current tenant plans to move to a competing project
across the street? How do we calculate the benefit of the landlord's
bargain in the original lease if the percentage rental clause makes
rent projection nearly impossible?
By recognizing the parties' "freedom to contract" for arbitrary
refusal of consent by the landlord, there is an implicit suggestion
that parties should address this issue, and other potential areas of
845, 220 Cal. Rptr. 818, 826 (1985)). Maxima also cited the following factors, which
were considered by a Florida court: "(a) Financial responsibility of the proposed sub-
tenant; (b) the 'identity' or 'business character' of the subtenant, i.e., suitability for the
particular building; (c) the need for alteration of the premises; (d) the legality of the
proposed use; and (e) the nature of the occupancy, i.e., office, factory, clinic, etc." Id
(citing Fernandez v. Vasquez, 397 So. 2d 1171, 1174 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)).
62. Id (quoting 1010 Potomac Assocs. v. Grocery Mfrs. of America, 485 A.2d 199,
210 (D.C. 1984)).
63. In Julian, the landlord indicated that he would consent to the sublease if the
tenants paid an additional $150 per month. 320 Md. at 4, 575 A.2d at 736. The court
called this "unreasonable." Id at 10, 575 A.2d at 739.
64. Because Maxima adopts the position that the court seeks to protect only the ben-
efits originally bargained for by the landlord, a tenant could charge the subtenant signifi-
candy more rent than the tenant is obligated to pay, and the original landlord cannot
reasonably refuse to consent to such a sublease in an effort to share in some market-
driven increase in his reversionary interest. See Maxima, 81 Md. App. at 613, 568 A.2d at
1176.
65. A percentage rent clause typically requires the tenant to pay the landlord a set
percentage of tenant's gross sales, or a percentage over a certain base amount of sales,
in addition to, or instead of a fixed rent. M. FRIEDMAN, FRIEDMAN ON LEASES § 6.1, at
188 (1990).
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dispute, in the contract negotiations. Parties should include in the
lease specific bases for which a landlord may refuse to consent to a
sublease. Such provisions would give the parties clear guidelines to
resolve a potential dispute, perhaps without judicial intervention. If
litigation ensues, the same provision will guide the court with spe-
cific standards that these parties have agreed are reasonable, and
enable it to rule on that basis.
VI. CONCLUSION
Julian v. Christopher changes Maryland law by ruling that a land-
lord may no longer unreasonably refuse consent to an assignment
or sublease, without express authority in the contract. The Julian
court cannot, however, be condemned for changing the rules of
contract interpretation after the fact. It avoids this criticism by ap-
plying its rule prospectively only, except for the parties before it.
The Julian decision does more than establish a rule of drafts-
manship: Julian shifts negotiating leverage from landlord to tenant.
It does so by guaranteeing full discussion and negotiation of a lease
term that has until now gone unconsidered by many tenants-occa-
sionally to their later dismay-as in this case.
Perhaps more important, Julian reaffirms the parties' right to
contract. While the court sends a clear message that public policy
does not permit a landlord to refuse consent arbitrarily without an
express reservation of the right to do so, c6 it makes equally clear
that public policy does not preclude landlord and tenant from nego-
tiating such a provision and contracting to it.67 This may provide an
answer for landlords, in particular, who have some trepidation
about what a court will deem a reasonable basis for refusal. They
may wish to include in the lease an extensive, though perhaps
nonexclusive, list of bases for refusal to consent. This list would
help the parties avoid litigation over this issue, but in the event of
litigation, the list would give the court a clear understanding of how
the parties themselves intended to define reasonableness.
JON M. LARIA
66. See Julian, 320 Md. at 11, 575 A.2d at 740.
67. See id. at 11-12, 575 A.2d at 740.
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